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$50,000, brings a derivative action he may be required to give se-
curity to the corporation and other defendants. In two recent
cases 37 the federal court held that the ,statute in no way affected
substantive rights and the federal court was not bound to apply the
state law. Had the same actions been brought in the New York
courts, they could not have been maintained without giving such
security. It would seem that Angel v. Bullington would require the
federal court to give effect to this statute requiring security, when
the action is being tried in a federal court on the basis of diversity
grounds alone.
It should be noted that where resort is had to a federal court,
not on grounds of diversity of citizenship, but because a federal right
is claimed, the limitation upon the courts of a state do not control a
federal court sitting in that state.38
It is evident that the holding in the Angel v. Bullington case is
within the spirit of the Erie case. The federal court is not admin-
istering another body of law, it merely gives out-of-state litigants a
court free from local bias. Although it may at times be difficult to
designate a particular law as substantive or adjective, it is evident
that where a state closes its doors to a particular type of action, the
law is substantive in nature and is expressive of the state's public
policy. Since the Erie case, Congress has permitted the holding,
without statutory change, and none is needed. A federal court in
diversity cases is only another court of the state, and the result of
a case tried before its tribunal should be substantially the same as
that of a state court.
The plaintiff is not entitled to a greater right in federal courts,
on the basis of diversity of citizenship, than he would receive in the
state court.
GEORGE H. HEMPSTEAD, JR.
THE PATENT REFUGE OF MONOPOLISTS
There has long been uncertainty as to the extent to which patent
holders might extend their patent monopoly without infringing the
purposes of the antitrust laws. In United States v. Line Material
Co.,1 a case involving an industry-wide patent license price-fixing
scheme, Judge Duffy likened this clash to "what would happen if an
37 Boyd v. Bell, 64 F. Supp. 22 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) ; Craftsman Finance &
Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
38 Honmberg v. Armbecht, 327 U. S. 392, 90 L. ed. 743 (1946).
'64 F. Supp. 970 (E. D. Wis. 1946).
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irresistible force came into collision with an unbreakable and im-
movable object." 2  He decided that the immovable object, i.e., the
patent laws, should prevail and his decision was followed in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co.3 As unsound in law, and in-
viting disastrous consequences to the free and competitive economy
that has been in large measure responsible for America's growth to
its present position of world leadership, both cases have been ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court will now be given the opportunity to
serve notice on all foes of a stable, expanding economy that an abuse
of the patent privilege, in order to provide a refuge for monopolists,
will not be tolerated.
Development of Patent Legislation
Federal-legislation with regard to the patent law is derived from
the Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have power: 4
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ecclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries ...
The actual conditions and terms upon which patents may be
granted to foster the purpose set forth in the Constitution are left to
the discretion of Congress, which may at any time alter these terms
and conditions. It is unquestionable, then, that the patent monopoly
is a state granted monopoly and is subject to the will of the people,
as conditioned by the constitutional provision.
In pursuance of the powers thus granted, Congress has passed
several statutes. The first legislation by Congress under this grant
was in 1790 when Congress provided that a patentee was granted
"the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing,
using and vending to others to be used, the said invention or dis-
covery." 5 This definition, with certain slight changes continued
until the Act of July 8, 1870, 6 provided that the patentee be given
the exclusive right "to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery
throughout the United States and the Territories thereof, .. ."
The constitutionality of this statutory provision is unquestioned,
and the courts have emphasized its position by construing it to be
directed primarily toward the promotion of science and the useful
arts, and toward the benefit of the community at large. The reason-
able reward held out to the patentee is said to be of secondary im-
portance, and is a benefit conferred by the people in recognition of
2 Id. at 972.
367 F. Supp. 397 (D. C. 1946).
4 U. S. CONST. Art I, § 8, Clause 8.
51 STAT. 109 (1790), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §40 (1940).6 RE v. STAT. § 4884 (1870), 35 U. S. C. §40 (1940).
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the public benefit conferred upon them by the inventors. The pur-
pose of the monopoly grant is to stimulate genius in the interest of
science.7 It would, therefore, seem that if an extension of the mo-
nopoly grant became violative of the above constitutional purpose,
such extension would not be upheld.
II
Delimiting the Patent Monopoly
The controversy over just what limitations on the patent mo-
nopoly granted by Congress had been introduced with the passage
of the Sherman Act 8 has been renewed with nearly every new anti-
trust case involving patents. Fully respectable authorities have been
cited on either side of the question, but despite such early cases as
Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co.,9 where the
court took the position that the Sherman Law was inapplicable to
patents, because there was no reference in the Antitrust Act to the
patent law, and the A. B. Dick case,10 where it was held that the
owner of a patented device could control the sale of unpatented arti-
cles, the courts have gradually cut down on the formerly unlimited
patent refuge of monopolists and would-be monopolists.
It is now well established that the fact that the patent owner
may keep the use of his patent to himself does not authorize him,
should he choose to license the manufacture or sale of the patented
product, to impose conditions or restrictions indiscriminately. For
example, in National Harrow Co. v. Hench," the court, holding that
an arrangement among the manufacturers of 70% of all harrows to
maintain prices as part of a patent pool was illegal, said:
Patents confer monopoly as respects the property covered by them, but they
confer no right upon the owners of several distinct patents to combine for the
purpose of restraining competition and trade. Patented property does not
differ in this respect from any other. . . . Patentees may compose their dif-
ferences, as the owners of other property may, but they cannot make the
occasion an excuse or cloak for the creation of monopolies to the public
disadvantage.
In November 1912, eight months after the decision in the A. B.
7 See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 328, 16 L. ed. 165, 168 (U. S.
1859); Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241, 8 L. ed. 376, 384 (U. S. 1832);
Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 18, 7 L. ed. 327, 333 (U. S. 1829).
8 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. . . " 26 STAT. 209 (1891),
15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
9 154 Fed. 358 (C. C. A. 7th 1907).
10 Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 645 (1912).
1183 Fed. 36, 38 (C. C. A. 3d 1897).
NOTES AND COMMENT
Dick case, the Supreme Court, in an equity suit by the Government 12
against 85% of the enamel-ware manufacturers in the United States,
held that a price-fixing arrangement among the manufacturers based
upon a patent relating to a process for enameling was illegal within
the prohibitions of the antitrust law and without the protection of
the patent law. Mr. Justice McKenna said: 13
The agreements clearly, therefore, transcended what was necessary to
protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which the law conferred upon
it. They passed to the purpose and accomplished a restraint of trade con-
demned by the Sherman law .... Rights conferred by patents are indeed very
definite and extensive, but they do not give any more than other rights, a
universal license against positive prohibitions. The Sherman law is a limita-
tion of rights-rights which may be pushed to evil consequences, and therefore
restrained.
In Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co.,'14 specifically over-
ruling the A. B. Dick case, the Supreme Court applied the test of
whether the power sought to be exercised by the patent owner was
reasonably to be found within the monopoly which Congress intended
to confer under the patent laws. The Court said: 15
Whatever right the owner may have to control by restriction the ma-
terials to be used in operating the machine must be derived through the gen-
eral law from the ownership of the property in the machine and it cannot be
derived from or protected by the patent law, which allows a grant only of
the right to an exclusive use of the new and useful discovery which has been
made--this and nothing more....
[The opposite view, as reflected in the Button Fastener case 16] proceeds
upon the argument that, since the patentee may withhold his patent altogether
from public use he must logically and necessarily be permitted to impose any
conditions which he chooses upon any use which he may allow of it. The
defect in this thinking springs from the substituting of inference and argu-
ment for the language of the statute and from failure to distinguish between
the rights which are given to the inventor by the patent law and which he
may assert against all the world through an infringement proceeding and rights
which he may create for himself by private contract which, however, are sub-
ject to the rules of general as distinguished from those of the patent law...
The Court also said in the Motion Picture Co. case: 17
In interpreting this language of the statute it will be of service to keep
in mind three rules long established by this court, applicable to the patent law
and to the construction of patents, viz.:
1st. The scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in
the claims contained in it, read in the light of the specification ...
2nd. It has long been settled that the patentee receives nothing from
the law which he did not have before,...
12 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 57 L. ed.
107 (1912).
13 Id. at 48, 49, 57 L. ed. at 117.
24 243 U. S. 502, 61 L. ed. 871 (1917).
'5 Id. at 513, 61 L. ed. at 877.
16 Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed.
288 (C. C. A. 6th 1896).
17 243 U. S. 502 at 510-511, 513, 516, 61 L. ed. at 876, 877, 879 (1917).
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3rd. Since Pennock v. Dialogue,18 . . . was decided in 1829 this court
has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts . . ."
In the Oil Cracking case,19 Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out
that, if there were domination or restraints, the fact that the agree-
ments were made pursuant to patents would not justify the monopoly
or the restraints, saying:
If combining patent owners effectively dominate an industry, the power
to fix and maintain royalties is tantamount to the power to fix prices...
Where domination exists, a pooling of competing process patents, . . . is beyond
the privileges conferred by the patents and constitutes a violation of the
Sherman Act.20
In 1926, however, in United States v. General Electric Co.
21
the Supreme Court, in an often criticized opinion,22 held that a li-
cense agreement by the General Electric Company to Westinghouse
requiring the fixing of prices by consignment contracts with their
distributors was a reasonable restriction within the power of the
patentee. t
It is important to note that in the aforementioned case General
Electric Company had developed and controlled the basic incandes-
cent lamp patents, and also that the court was ruling on a situation
where a licensor was licensing a single licensee and asserting a lim-
ited control over the latter's selling conditions.
In the General Electric case, the court relied heavily on Bement
v. National Harrow Company 23 where the holding was confined to
the legality of the particular contract between the parties. The de-
cision more than likely would have been otherwise had the situation
of other manufacturers, the extent of domination of the industry and
the purpose of the licensor been considered. In United States v.
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co.,24 the Bement case was distinguished
from it on the foregoing grounds. The Standard Sanitary case is,
at least in spirit, definitely in conflict with the General Electric case.
The Bement case was held inapplicable in Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale
& Towne Mfg. Co.,25 thus holding contracts relating to the control
of the production of door checks by patent license agreements was
an abuse of the patent privilege and violative of the Sherman Act.
Is 2 Pet. 1, 7 L. ed. 327 (1829).
19 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, 75 L. ed. 926 (1931).
20 Id. at 174, 75 L. ed. at 948.
21272 U. S. 476, 71 L. ed. 362 (1926).
22 See Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, 56 YALE L. J. 1, 2-6
(1946) ; Hagighurst, The Legal Status of Industrial Control by Patents, 35
ILL. L. REv. 495, 517-518 (1941); Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels,
41 HARv. L. Rlv. 945, 993 (1928).
23 186 U. S. 70i 94, 46 L. ed. 1058, 1070 (1902).
24226 U. S. 20, 57 L. ed. 107 (1912).
25 166 Fed. 555, 559 (D. Mass. 1909); see also. National Harrow Co. v.




Applicability of the General Electric Doctrine
The decision in the General Electric case has since been relied
on extensively by groups desiring to assure themselves of greater
profits through the elimination of competition within their industries.
This type of conduct was the basis of the Government's complaint
in two recent cases. In United States v. Line Material CoY ° the
court extended the General Electric case to sanction industry-wide
price-fixing. In United States v. United States Gypsum Company,27
the Court held that the General Electric case was applicable to a
situation where a group controlled the manufacture and distribution
of all of the gypsum board and 80% of the plaster and miscellaneous
gypsum products manufactlred and sold in the area East of the Rocky
Mountains under a license by United States Gypsum Co. to use cer-
tain of its patents. Thus they organized a combination whereby
prices were fixed and uniform production and distribution methods
were adopted. It went on to state that the license agreements in this
case "were patterned upon the General Electric decision and the li-
cense agreements which in that case were sanctioned by the Supreme
Court." 28
Not only can it be said that the General Electric doctrine is in-
applicable to industry-wide situations such as appear in the Line
Materials and Gypsum cases, but one would be well justified in ques-
tioning the General Electric holding itself as being contrary to the
principles of patent law repeatedly approved and applied by the
courts.
Taking the latter point first, it would be well to keep in mind
the purpose of the patent grants as interpreted by the courts. Since
Pennock v. Dialogue and Kendall v. Winsor, it has been held that
the patent monopoly was primarily granted, not for the creation of
private fortunes, but for the promotion of scientific progress and the
best interests of the public. This view has been followed consis-
tently by the courts and was affirmed in United States v. Masonite
Corp.,29 where the court went further to say that since the monopoly
26 64 F. Supp. 970 (E. D. Wis. 1946).
27 67 F. Supp. 397 (D. C. 1946).2 8 Id. at 437.
29 316 U. S. 265, 280, 86 L. ed. 1461, 1477 (1942). See other leading cases,
indicating the extent to which the doctrine in the General Electric case has
been limited or distinguished either expressly or impliedly: MacGregor v.
Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 329 U. S. 402, 91 L. ed. 319
(1947) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 406, 89 L. ed.
322 (1944); Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173, 87
L. ed. 165 (1942); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 249,
86 L. ed. 1408 (1941); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U. S. 495, 86 L. ed.
367 (1941); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488, 86 L. ed. 363
1947]
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rights conferred by patents constitute a grant of a special privilege
in derogation of the policy of equal opportunity and freedom of trade
embodied both in the common law and federal statutory law, the
rights given by the patent law are to be strictly confined to those
expressly granted. Nowhere in the patent statutes can there be found
anything remotely suggesting the power to fix prices in license
agreements.
The Court in the General Electric case used as its test of legal-
ity of price-fixing agreements in a patent license whether it was
"normally and reasonably adapted" as a means of securing to the
patentee pecuniary reward for his monopoly, and to encourage the
licensing of other manufacturers. As pointed out by Professor
Steffen a ° ". . . the last two decades have demonstrated fairly well
that the court by so holding not only eliminated all real competition
between licensor and licensee, contrary to the broad purposes of
Congress as declared in the Sherman Act, but destroyed the chief
incentive to the development of new and better products, contrary
to the constitutional warrant for the patent system itself . . . . By
bringing both licensee and licensor-in fact, whole industries-within
the shelter of the monopoly price, at only a modest royalty, the com-
petitive necessity either (a) to contest the patentee's patents or
(b) to develop a new and better product, is almost wholly removed.
So far from promoting 'the progress of science and useful arts',
therefore, the decision has operated as a deterrent."
In the General Electric case the Court was swayed by the argu-
ment that where both licensor and licensee are making and selling
the patented product, a provision in the licensing agreement that his
licensee not sell at a lower price would be normally and reasonably
adapted to secure to the patentee the reward granted him in the pat-
ent statute, and would tend to promote the progress of science in
that he would not hold back his license for fear of ruinous competi-
tion by his licensees. Can the Court have failed to realize that the
right to exact such royalty payments as the patentee chose would
not only secure to him the reasonable reward to which he is en-
titled, but would also serve to protect him from competition by his
licensees inasmuch as the royalty fixed by him would add as much
as he desired to their production costs? 31 To allow the patentee a
greater reward by giving him the right to fix the prices of his li-
(1941); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 85 L. ed. 1416 (1941); Marsh v.
Buck, 313 U. S. 406, 85 L. ed. 1426 (1941); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U. S. 436, 84 L. ed. 852 (1940); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66,
83 L. ed. 1111 (1939). See also Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust
Judgments Through Hartford-Empire, 34 GEo. L. J. 1 (1945) ; Bennett, Some
Reflections on the Interpretation of the Sherman Act Since the Emergency,
in a forthcoming issue of THE FEDERAL BAR JoURNAL (1947).
30 Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, 56 YALE L. J. 1, 6 (1946).
31 But see Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Edward Katzinger Co. v.
Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., - U. S. -, -, 91 L. ed. 319, 329 (1947).
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censees would go beyond the scope of the patent grant and should
subject him to all the interdictions against restraints of trade and the
suppression of competition known to the general law.
Taking up the consideration of the applicability of the General
Electric doctrine to industry-wide price-fixing based on licensing of
erstwhile competitors, it is difficult to see how the courts in United
States v. Line Material Company and in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co. would consent to such an extension of the patent
monopoly. The court in the General Electric case merely held that
it is within the scope of his patent grant for a patentee to enter into
a single and isolated license agreement which requires the licensee
not to sell below the licensor's own selling price. By what reason-
ing can this be stretched to the point where an industry-wide com-
bination of manufacturers is to be allowed to restrain trade through
joining in a licensing agreement equipped with price-fixing provi-
sions under a patent held by one? ". . . if an entire industry made
up of erstwhile competitors were to be signed up under a patent,
. . . price fixing, in such a case . . . would not only give the li-
censor a pecuniary reward for his invention, but would give the whole
combination a much larger and surer profit by the elimination of
competition between themselves." 32
In United States v. Masonite Corp.,33 it was held that when a
patentee unites and uses the marketing systems of competitors by
means of del credere agency agreements, for the purpose of fixing
the prices at which the competitors may market the product, this
is an enlargement of the patent privilege and a violation of the Sher-
man Act because its effect is to secure to the patentee rewards flowing
from industry-wide protection against price competition rather than,
or in addition to, such reward as the patentee might secure from
exercise of the right of exclusion conferred by patent law. It would
seem that no real distinction can be drawn where the patent holder
goes further and licenses his competitors to make, as well as to sell,
the patented article. In the one case, as in the other, the ensuing
industry-wide price-fixing should constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act.
Conclusion
The disclosures in the many suits brought by the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice have affirmed the truth of the
32 See Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, 56 YALE L. J. 1, 5
(1946), citing Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking of a similar situation in United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 278, 279, 86 L. ed. 1461, 1475 (1942),
"That would allow the patent owner, under guise of his patent monopoly, not
merely to secure a reward for his invention but to secure protection from
competition which the patent law, unaided by restrictive agreements, does not
afford."
33 316 U. S. 265, 86 L. ed. 1461 (1942).
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view long held in some quarter that businessmen often would rather
combine to attain risk-free profits than to chance the uncertainties
of competition.3 4  It would be far too simple for would-be monop-.
olists and price fixers to utilize the General Electric doctrine as a
"dodge" to enable them to do through the abuse of patent rights
what the Antitrust laws prohibit directly.8 5 Price-fixing in a license
agreement is not necessary in order to insure a normal and reasonable
"pecuniary reward" to the patentee. The reservation of a fair royalty
by the licensor should be enough to satisfy all but the monopoly-
minded businessman.
JULius E. YOKEL.
Is EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S WEALTH ADMISSIBLE WHEN
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE AWARDED IN NEW YORK?
In a tort action that warrants an award of punitive damages,
should evidence of the financial status of the defendant be admitted
to enable the jury to determine the amount of the judgment? It is
conceded that in assessing compensatory damages the wealth of the
defendant should play no part,1 for by their very nature they are
given simply to make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong
and to compensate for the injuries sustained, nothing more.2 The
34 "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public,
or in some contrivance to raise prices." 1 SMrITH, WEALTH OF. NATioNs
(Rogers' ed. 1869) 135, 136.
35 See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 278, 86 L. ed. 1461,
1475 (1942), where the Court, keeping in mind the fact that the patent grant
is primarily for the public benefit, said that this must be the point of departure
for decision on the facts of antitrust cases involving patents "lest the limited
patent privilege be enlarged by private agreements so as to by-pass the Sherman
Act." See also Mr. Justice Story's statement in Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1,
19, 7 L. ed. 327, 333 (U. S. 1829), that the promotion of the progress of
science and the useful arts is the main objective of the patent laws and that
the reward of inventors is secondary and merely a means to that end; and
Mr. Justice Daniel's statement in Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 329, 16
L. ed. 165, 168 (U. S. 1858), that "Whilst the remuneration of genius and
useful ingenuity is a duty incumbent upon the public, the rights and welfare
of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded. Con-
siderations of individual emolument can never be permitted to operate to the
injury of these."
I Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 52 N. E: 679 (1899).
2 Reid v. Terwilliger, 116 N. Y. 530, 22 N. E. 1091 (1889).
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